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NOT JUST FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY:  
APPLYING THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
BEYOND ITS ORIGINS 
Danielle Sawaya* 
 
Most litigants, if given the chance, prefer to assert tort theories to 
recover their economic losses, rather than rely on the remedies provided 
under contract law.  This is primarily because plaintiffs have the potential 
to recover more damages under tort law than contract law.  However, most 
courts have adopted a doctrine known as the economic loss rule to bar 
plaintiffs from asserting certain tort theories to recover for their economic 
loss.  Although the economic loss rule may seem like an easy way to 
maintain the boundary between tort law and contract law, confusion 
abounds when courts attempt to determine the proper contexts in which to 
apply the doctrine. 
In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court resurrected issues of the doctrine’s 
proper scope when it rendered Tiara Condominium Ass‘n v. Marsh & 
McLennan Cos., which restricted application of the doctrine to products 
liability cases.  Although the Florida Supreme Court has held that the 
economic loss rule applies only when a defective product causes pecuniary 
loss to the plaintiff, other jurisdictions adhere to a broader application of 
the doctrine.  In these jurisdictions, the doctrine serves a fundamental 
purpose to protect the boundary line between tort law and contract law by 
preventing parties who are in contractual privity from circumventing the 
bargain that they made in their contract.  This Note argues that the 
economic loss rule is not just for products liability, but should be applied to 
serve such a fundamental purpose, specifically where sophisticated parties 
engage in arms-length transactions, bargaining for the allocation of risk 
and economic loss in their contract. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a contractor purchases a new truck for hauling equipment in his 
construction business.  One day when he was attempting to slow down for a 
turn, he discovered that the brakes did not work.  The vehicle overturned, 
but luckily he was not injured.  It took two weeks to fix the truck and cost 
$5000.  As a result of his inability to use the vehicle, the contractor‘s 
business operations were disrupted, causing him to lose $9000 in profit.  If 
the contractor sues the manufacturer or distributor of his truck, may he 
recover the cost of repair and his lost earnings?1 
Assume a buyer purchases a laptop computer for use in her business.  
The laptop is defective, malfunctions, and requires a week to be repaired.  
As a result, the laptop purchaser loses business.  In fact, she is able to prove 
that the defective laptop caused her to lose $50,000 in profit.  If the laptop 
owner sues the laptop manufacturer, may she recover her lost profit? 
Finally, suppose a fisherman purchases a motor and installs it in his boat 
for his fishing business.  The motor turns out to be defective and catches 
fire.  Fortunately, the fisherman was not injured.  However, because of the 
defective motor the fisherman was not able to fish during the peak of the 
season and thus lost a substantial profit.  If the fisherman sues the 
manufacturer or distributor of the motor, may he recover for his economic 
loss? 
Courts usually answer each of the foregoing questions in the negative.2  
The reason courts generally will not allow the contractor, the laptop 
purchaser, and the fisherman to recover for their economic losses is because 
of a tort doctrine known as the economic loss rule.3  The economic loss rule 
bars plaintiffs from recovering tort damages for their economic loss where 
the plaintiff has not sustained personal injury or property damage.4  The 
genesis of the economic loss rule can be traced to California where the 
state‘s highest court barred a plaintiff from recovering economic damages 
 
 1. The facts in this hypothetical are adapted from Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 
145 (Cal. 1965). 
 2. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 
(1986) (noting that where only a product is injured the plaintiff‘s remedy lies in contract and 
warranty law); Seely, 403 P.2d 145 (precluding the plaintiff from recovering damages for his 
defective truck based on a strict products liability theory); Dobrovolny v. Ford Motor Co., 
793 N.W.2d 445 (Neb. 2011) (barring recovery based on a products liability theory where 
the plaintiff‘s Ford pickup truck caught fire and burned, but did not cause physical injury or 
damage to other property). 
 3. See 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 449 (2d ed. 2011). 
 4. See Seely, 403 P.2d at 151 (noting that a manufacturer‘s liability is limited to 
instances where the plaintiff sustains physical injury and ―there is no recovery for economic 
loss alone‖); see also 2 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, § 449. 
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caused by a defective truck.5  Twenty-one years later, the U.S. Supreme 
Court adopted the doctrine in an admiralty case involving a defective 
product.6  Today, most jurisdictions have followed suit and apply the 
doctrine to preclude plaintiffs from recovering tort damages for a defective 
product, absent personal injury or property damage.7 
Although the majority of jurisdictions apply the economic loss rule in the 
context of products liability, confusion abounds with respect to the 
doctrine‘s application outside the realm of products liability cases.8  In fact, 
the Florida Supreme Court, after expanding the doctrine beyond the 
products liability context, returned the economic loss rule to its origins.9  In 
Tiara Condominium Ass’n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos.,10 the Florida 
Supreme Court stated that the expansion of the economic loss rule outside 
of products liability had become ―unwise and unworkable in practice.‖11  
However, as one of the dissenting opinions note, the majority‘s decision 
failed to explain why the economic loss rule is appropriate in products 
liability cases but is ―unworkable or unwise in [a] broader context.‖12 
Tiara illustrates the principal issue surrounding the economic loss rule:  
whether (and to what extent) the doctrine should apply outside of the 
products liability context.  Although there are many variations of the 
economic loss rule, it is not the intent of this Note to explain application of 
the doctrine in each and every context or in each and every jurisdiction.  
Rather, this Note focuses on the doctrine‘s application in the State of 
Florida and on the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision to limit the economic 
loss rule to products liability cases.  This Note contends that the doctrine is 
not just for products liability, and such a bright-line approach undermines 
the doctrine‘s fundamental purpose to protect the boundary line between 
tort law and contract law.  Instead, the Florida courts should return to 
applying the doctrine in contractual privity contexts.  This Note, however, 
does not argue for application of the doctrine in every circumstance where 
the parties are in contractual privity.  Rather, this Note argues that the 
economic loss rule should be applied in the specific context where 
sophisticated parties to a contract have bargained (or could have bargained) 
for the allocation of risk and economic loss in their contract, and it offers a 
 
 5. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151–52. 
 6. E. River, 476 U.S. at 871 (―[W]e adopt an approach similar to Seely and hold that a 
manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict 
products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.‖). 
 7. See id. at 868 (noting that the majority land-based approach ―precludes imposing tort 
liability if a defective product causes purely monetary harm‖); Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. 
Loftus, Riding the Choppy Waters of East River:  Economic Loss Doctrine Ten Years Later, 
64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260, 261 (1997) (asserting that East River profoundly influenced the 
adoption of the economic loss rule in a majority of jurisdictions); Vincent R. Johnson, The 
Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 526 
(2009) (stating that there is a ―high degree of agreement‖ that purely economic losses 
resulting from a defective product are not recoverable under tort law). 
 8. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 526–28. 
 9. Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 407 (Fla. 2013). 
 10. 110 So. 3d 399 (Fla. 2013). 
 11. Id. at 407. 
 12. Id. at 413 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
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framework that entails absolute deference to contract.  It is arguably in such 
circumstances that the doctrine‘s purpose of maintaining the boundary line 
between tort law and contract law is most validated. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the economic loss rule.  
Specifically, it examines what the doctrine is, the types of losses that fall 
within its purview, and the origin and development of the rule.  Part II 
examines the Florida courts‘ struggle to define the scope of the economic 
loss rule and the Florida Supreme Court‘s decision to restrict application of 
the doctrine exclusively to products liability cases.  Finally, Part III argues 
for a broader application of the doctrine, particularly where sophisticated 
parties engage in arms-length transactions, bargaining for the allocation of 
risk and economic loss in their contract.  When such conditions are present, 
the economic loss rule should be applied, unless the contract says 
otherwise. 
I.   BACKGROUND OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE:  
FROM PRODUCTS LIABILITY TO CONTRACTUAL PRIVITY 
The economic loss rule is a broad rule that is applied in several types of 
cases.  This part provides an overview of the economic loss rule by 
discussing two particular situations where the doctrine is applied:  
(1) products liability cases and (2) contractual privity cases.13  Part I.A 
introduces the general concept of the economic loss rule and considers the 
specific types of losses that fall within its purview.  Part I.B surveys the 
origin and development of the economic loss rule in American 
jurisprudence.  Lastly, Part I.C examines application of the doctrine in cases 
where the parties to a contract are in contractual privity. 
A.   Understanding the Economic Loss Rule 
and What Constitutes Economic Loss 
This section explains the general concept of the economic loss rule.  It 
then discusses the types of losses that fall within the scope of the doctrine.  
Next, it provides examples of what constitutes noneconomic loss, and thus 
potentially recoverable under tort law.  Finally, this section concludes by 
discussing the benefits of suing under a tort theory rather than relying on 
the remedies of contract law. 
1.   What Is the Economic Loss Rule? 
In the most basic sense, the economic loss rule is a judicially created 
doctrine that serves to prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages under tort 
law (generally, strict liability claims and negligence claims)14 when the 
 
 13. For purposes of this Note, references to contractual privity cases include products 
liability and non-products liability cases. 
 14. Johnson, supra note 7, at 528.  Although the broad term ―tort law‖ is often used to 
express the concept of the economic loss rule, it is important to note that the doctrine does 
not bar recovery for pure economic loss for all torts. See id. at 529–34.  There are exceptions 
under tort law where the doctrine does not prevent plaintiffs from recovering damages for 
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only harm suffered is pure economic loss.15  Several Florida courts have 
observed, however, that the economic loss rule is ―stated with ease but 
applied with great difficulty.‖16  To a large extent, the confusion and 
difficulty surrounding the doctrine‘s application is due to the fact that the 
economic loss rule is not a single rule.17  Rather, it is a general rule under 
which several sub-rules or variations of the rule exist.18  This is because 
economic losses arise from a variety of situations, requiring different 
analyses.19 
Before the Florida Supreme Court restricted application of the economic 
loss rule exclusively to the products liability context,20 Florida courts 
primarily applied the doctrine in two situations:  products liability cases and 
cases where contractual privity existed between the parties.21  Within the 
context of products liability, the economic loss rule prohibits a plaintiff 
from recovering damages in tort when a defective product causes purely 
economic loss.22  In other words, a defendant‘s tort liability with respect to 
a defective product is limited to instances where the plaintiff sustains 
personal injury or property damage to property other than the product 
itself.23  In a contractual context, a plaintiff who incurs purely economic 
loss as a result of the defendant‘s breach of an express or implied 
contractual duty is barred from recovering tort damages, absent an 
independent tort duty.24  In other words, a plaintiff‘s tort action to recover 
 
their pure economic loss (e.g., intentionally tortious conduct). Id.  Such exceptions, however, 
are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 15. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (stating that ―a 
manufacturer‘s liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery 
for economic loss alone‖); see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 525–26.  For purposes of this 
discussion, pure economic loss can be understood as financial costs to the plaintiff that do 
not arise from personal injury to the plaintiff or damage to the plaintiff‘s property. See Ralph 
C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine:  Distinguishing Economic Loss from Non-
Economic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2008). 
 16. See, e.g., Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 544 (Fla. 
2004) (Cantero, J., concurring) (noting that such phrase has been cited in Delgado v. J.W. 
Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); 
Sandarac Ass‘n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1992)); see also Comptech Int‘l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So. 2d 1219, 1224 
(Fla. 1999) (noting that ―confusion . . . has abounded in this area of law‖). 
 17. See 3 DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 607 (2d ed. 2011).  According to Dobbs, 
references to ―the‖ economic loss rule are misleading because it implies that there is one 
overarching rule that courts apply. Id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id.  Although there are several variations of the economic loss rule, this Note 
primarily focuses on the products liability and contractual privity forms of the rule.  As such, 
other variations of the doctrine are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be addressed. 
 20. Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 407 (Fla. 2013) 
(holding that ―the economic loss rule applies only in the products liability context‖). 
 21. Am. Aviation, 891 So. 2d at 534 (limiting the economic loss rule to ―circumstances 
where the parties are either in contractual privity or the defendant is a manufacturer or 
distributor of a product, and no established exception to the application of the rule applies‖). 
 22. Id. at 538–41. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 536–38.  An example of a tort independent of the contract is fraud. Id. at 543 
n.3. 
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purely economic loss will be barred where the defendant has not committed 
a breach apart from the breach of contract.25 
2.   What Qualifies As ―Economic Loss‖ 
for Purposes of the Economic Loss Rule? 
Before exploring the development of the economic loss rule, it is 
important to distinguish economic loss from noneconomic loss.  The 
distinction is important because the type of loss incurred dictates whether 
the plaintiff will be able to recover damages based on a tort theory or a 
breach of contract claim, if any.26 
In the most general sense, economic losses are ―disappointed economic 
expectations.‖27  In the context of products liability, economic loss may 
include damages for inadequate value of a product, costs of repair and 
replacement of the defective product, or consequential lost profits as a result 
of a defective product.28  According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts on 
products liability, if a defective product29 causes purely economic loss, a 
plaintiff‘s claim for damages cannot be resolved through tort law but is 
limited to the terms of the contract and the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC).30  The Restatement provides examples of what constitutes 
economic loss, illustrated below.31 
a.   Harm Only to the Product Itself 
One type of pure economic loss is when the product causes harm only to 
itself.32  This type of harm comes in two forms.33  First, a product may be 
defective causing a buyer to incur repair or replacement costs.34  Second, a 
 
 25. Id. at 536–37. 
 26. See Anzivino, supra note 15, at 1082.  For a discussion of the advantages of suing on 
a tort theory rather than on a breach of contract claim, see infra Part I.A.4. 
 27. Casa Clara Condo. Ass‘n v. Charley Toppino & Sons Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1246 
(Fla. 1993) (quoting Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 
58 (Va. 1988); Stuart v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc., 745 P.2d 1284 (Wash. 
1987)). 
 28. Id. (quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. 
REV. 917, 918 (1966)). 
 29. The Restatement defines a product as ―tangible personal property distributed 
commercially for use or consumption.‖ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. 
§ 19(a) (1998).  Other items, such as real estate, may also be considered a product when the 
context of its use is analogous to the use of tangible personal property. Id.  Services, 
however, are not considered products. Id. 
 30. Id. § 21 cmt. a. 
 31. See infra notes 32–52 and accompanying text; see also Anzivino, supra note 15, at 
1087–92. 
 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.  An example is the cost of repair of a truck after defective brakes caused the 
vehicle to overturn. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 147–48 (Cal. 1965) 
(reviewing plaintiff‘s action against a manufacturer and distributor for the cost of repair of 
his truck in the amount of $5466.09 after defective brakes caused the vehicle to overturn). 
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buyer may sustain consequential losses35 as a result of a defect in the 
product.36  The Restatement provides an illustration of the latter form of 
economic loss:  ABC company sells a conveyer belt to XYZ automobile 
company.37  After XYZ installs the conveyer belt in its engine assembly 
line, a defect in the conveyer belt causes it to break.38  As a result, the 
production lines shut down.39  XYZ loses valuable production time when 
launching its best-selling new model.40  The trier of fact finds that the 
shutdown of the production lines caused XYZ to lose the sales of the cars 
that would have been produced.41  It also finds that XYZ lost the 
opportunity to be the first to market the new model thereby losing millions 
of dollars to its rival company which was able to introduce its new model a 
week ahead of XYZ instead of a week behind it.42  According to the 
Restatement, XYZ has suffered pure economic loss in the form of 
consequential losses and cannot recover from ABC under a tort cause of 
action.43 
b.   Harm As a Result of a Component Part of an Integrated System 
Another type of pure economic loss that is not recoverable under tort law 
is harm that results from a defective product that is a component part of an 
integrated system that causes harm only to the integrated system.44  Such 
harm is deemed to be damage to the product itself (and not damage to other 
property for which tort remedies may be available).45  This is known as the 
integrated system rule.46  Under this rule, when the defective product and 
the system are considered to be an integrated whole and the harm caused by 
the defective product is limited to the system itself, such harm will not be 
 
 35. For purposes of this discussion, consequential loss may be understood as indirect 
financial loss as a result of the defective product. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d.  Loss of profit is one example. See Anzivino, supra note 15, at 
1088. 
 36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d. 
 37. Id. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id.  A more difficult situation may arise where the defect in the product makes it 
unreasonably dangerous, but the product does not cause harm to persons or property. Id. § 21 
cmt. d.  The Restatement acknowledges that a plausible argument may be made that products 
that are dangerous, and not merely inoperable, should be subject to products liability law. Id.  
Nevertheless, a majority of jurisdictions have held that the remedies under the UCC—repair 
and replacement costs and consequential economic loss—are sufficient. Id. 
 44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e; Anzivino, supra 
note 15, at 1088. 
 45. Anzivino, supra note 15, at 1088. 
 46. Id. The integrated system rule was applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in E. River 
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).  For a more detailed 
discussion of the Court‘s application of the rule, see infra Part I.B.2. 
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considered damage to other property.47  Rather, such harm is purely 
economic loss and unrecoverable under tort law.48 
An example of the integrated system rule can be seen in the 
Restatement‘s illustration of the conveyer belt.49  The defective conveyer 
belt is a component part of the assembly line.50  The damage to the 
assembly line that caused XYZ‘s lost profits is considered damage to the 
product itself, and so it may not be recovered under tort law.51  The 
Restatement notes that rejecting the integrated system rule would result in a 
finding of property damage in essentially every case in which a product 
harms itself.52 
c.   Pure Economic Loss Caused by Economic Torts 
Economic torts concern pure economic losses (i.e., financial losses that 
do not result from personal injury or property damage) in which the 
plaintiff maintains a legally recognized possessory or ownership interest.53  
Dan Dobbs provides such an example where a defendant negligently blocks 
access to a plaintiff‘s store, without actually harming the property itself.54  
In this example, the plaintiff has suffered pure economic loss because the 
only harm the plaintiff incurred was a loss of profit from the inability of 
customers to access the store.55  This type of economic harm does not 
provide the storeowner with a legally recognized interest.56  Thus, the 
storeowner‘s claim for pure economic loss will be precluded under the 
economic loss rule.57 
3.   Noneconomic Loss:  The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Bar 
Recovery for Economic Harm or ―Other Property Damage‖ 
Economic harm may be distinguished from stand-alone economic torts.58  
Unlike stand-alone economic torts, economic harm can result from any type 
of tort.59  For example, medical bills and loss of wages may occur because 
of a tort that causes the plaintiff to suffer personal injury or even emotional 
harm; and decreased property value and repair costs are economic harms 
that may result from torts that cause physical damage to property.60  
 
 47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e; Anzivino, supra 
note 15, at 1088. 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e; Anzivino, supra 
note 15, at 1088. 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d, illus. 3. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. § 21 cmt. e. 
 53. See 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 605. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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However, each such instance of economic harm is not an economic tort;61 
rather, the economic harm is a part of the damages resulting from a personal 
injury or property tort.62  Such forms of economic harm do not fall within 
the scope of the economic loss rule, and therefore, plaintiffs are not 
precluded from recovering these damages.63 
Another form of economic harm that does not fall within the purview of 
the economic loss rule is when the harm caused by a defective product is to 
―other property.‖64  A product that is unworkable or malfunctions due to a 
defect and causes harm to surrounding property has caused ―other property 
damage.‖65  For example, if a defective automobile blows up without 
damaging any surrounding property or persons, the claim is subject to the 
economic loss rule and leaves the owner to sue on the warranty or not at 
all.66  However, if the defective automobile also blows up a neighboring 
home, the home is considered ―other property‖ and not the product itself.67  
Thus, the homeowner may recover damages to the home based on a tort 
claim.68 
As previously discussed, when economic harm comes from ―other 
property damage,‖ a plaintiff‘s claim ordinarily will not be barred by the 
economic loss rule.69  This is because the damage to the surrounding 
property extends beyond the product or its integrated system.70  The 
Restatement illustrates this type of damage with a hypothetical.71  A 
company has an assembly line at its plant.72  A defective steering 
mechanism in the company‘s forklift causes the forklift to go out of control 
and damage the assembly line.73  The damages stemming from the 
defective forklift are considered to be ―other property damage‖ actionable 
through tort theories.74  Because the defective steering mechanism caused 
damage beyond the forklift to the assembly line, the integrated system rule 
is not applicable.75  The damages are noneconomic losses and potentially 
recoverable under tort theories.76 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. (―Such a claim for pure economic loss will often be rejected under one of the 
economic loss rules.‖). 
 64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e (1998); 2 DOBBS ET 
AL., supra note 3, § 449. 
 65. 2 DOBBS ET AL, supra note 3, § 449. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. e, illus. 4 (1998). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. § 21 cmt. e. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
2014] THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BEYOND ITS ORIGINS 1083 
The Supreme Court considered the issue of what constitutes ―other 
property‖ in Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co.77  The case 
involved a defective hydraulic system that caused the engine room in a 
fishing vessel to flood, catch fire, and ultimately sink the boat.78  Saratoga 
brought a products liability suit against the designer of the ship‘s hydraulic 
system and the builder of the vessel.79  Saratoga had purchased the fishing 
vessel from the initial owner who had added equipment to the ship after he 
had purchased it.80  The Court concluded that the damage to the boat was 
not recoverable because it constituted the product itself.81  The issue before 
the Court was whether the added equipment was part of the boat (i.e., the 
―product itself‖ in which case the plaintiff could not recover under a tort 
theory for any loss) or whether it constituted ―other property‖ (in which 
case the plaintiff could potentially recover).82  The Court held that the 
subsequently added equipment qualified as ―other property,‖ and thus 
recovery for the damage to the equipment was available.83 
4.   Why a Plaintiff May Prefer to Sue on a Tort Theory 
Rather than Under a Contract 
Generally, breach of contract claims result when a party violates the 
terms of an agreement made with another party, whereas tort claims are 
generally pursued where the plaintiff has incurred physical injury or 
property damage.84  However, there are instances where a tort claim and a 
contract claim can ensue from the same conduct.85  In such cases, plaintiffs 
will often attempt to assert both contract and tort claims.86  Affording a 
plaintiff a tort remedy, as opposed to a contract remedy, has certain 
 
 77. 520 U.S. 875 (1997); id. at 886 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―Not a single lower court 
decision (other than the one under review) has addressed the precise question presented:  the 
status as ‗other property‘ of additions made by a prior purchaser who was a user.‖). 
 78. Id. at 877 (majority opinion). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  The equipment added by the initial owner after he purchased the fishing vessel 
included a skiff, a fishing net, spare parts, and miscellaneous equipment. Id. 
 81. See id. (―In this case all agree that the ‗product itself‘ consists at least of a ship as 
built and outfitted by its original manufacturer and sold to an initial user.‖). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 884–85. 
 84. See TODD SORENSEN ET AL., WHEN CAN A BREACH OF CONTRACT BE A TORT AND 
WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE?, A.B.A. CLE SEMINAR (Feb. 16–19, 2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2012_cccle
_materials/12_tort.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 85. R. Joseph Barton, Drowning in a Sea of Contract:  Application of the Economic Loss 
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 
1797 (2000). 
 86. See, e.g., AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 796 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 
1986) (involving claims for negligence and breach of contract); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 785 F.2d 952, 953 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving claims for 
negligence and for breach of express warranties in the contract); Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. 
Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 401 (Fla. 2013) (reviewing on appeal the 
plaintiff‘s breach of contract and negligence claims against an insurance broker). 
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advantages.87  Casting a claim under tort law provides at least three 
advantages over contract law.88 
First, contract law generally limits a defendant‘s liability to damages that 
are reasonably foreseeable as a result of the breach of contractual duties.89  
On the other hand, tort law exposes defendants to liability for all damages 
proximately caused by the defendant‘s tort.90  Thus, under a tort theory the 
plaintiff may be able to recover more damages.91  For example, although 
punitive damages are generally not available in contract law, they are 
sometimes available in tort.92  Second, a plaintiff may be able to bring a tort 
claim long after the statute of limitations has run on a plaintiff‘s contract 
claim93 because the tort law statute of limitations usually begins to run only 
after the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury.94  Finally, the 
standard of proof to recover tort damages is less rigorous than the standard 
for contract claims.95 
Given the advantages of tort law for plaintiffs, the economic loss rule 
serves a fundamental purpose to prevent ―contract law [from drowning] in a 
sea of tort.‖96  As discussed below, an important justification for the 
economic loss rule is to prevent plaintiffs from using tort law to circumvent 
the parties‘ bargain and allocation of duties and risks in their contract.97 
B.   The Origins of the Economic Loss Rule in American Jurisprudence 
To understand how the economic loss rule is currently applied, it is 
helpful to examine the origins and development of the doctrine in American 
 
 87. SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84. 
 88. See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text. 
 89. SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (―Punitive damages 
are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also 
a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.‖), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 901 (1979) (permitting plaintiffs to recover damages ―to punish wrongdoers and deter 
wrongful conduct‖). 
 93. Typically, the statute of limitations for a contract claim begins to run at the time the 
contract is breached, irrespective of whether the aggrieved party knew or should have known 
of the breach. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (2012). 
 94. See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L. 
REV. 1, 36 (2005) (noting that a majority of jurisdictions follow the discovery rule, which 
provides that ―a cause of action accrues not when the plaintiff is injured but when the 
plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, pertinent facts 
about the injury‖). 
 95. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (requiring ―as much certainty as 
the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit‖), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 352 (―Damages are not recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the 
evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.‖). 
 96. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (―It is 
clear, however, that if this development were allowed to progress too far, contract law would 
drown in a sea of tort.‖).  See infra Part I.C. for a discussion of the boundary-line 
justification of the economic loss rule. 
 97. See infra Part I.C. 
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jurisprudence.  This section examines the landmark decisions where the 
doctrine originated. 
1.   The Economic Loss Rule Is Created from Products Liability 
The economic loss rule originated in the 1965 California Supreme Court 
products liability case Seely v. White Motor Co.98  The plaintiff purchased a 
truck from the defendant for his heavy-duty hauling business.99  Upon 
acquiring the truck, the plaintiff found that the vehicle bounced violently.100  
Eleven months after purchasing the truck, the plaintiff was slowing down 
for a turn when he discovered that the brakes did not work.101  The truck 
overturned, but the plaintiff was not injured.102  Due to the inability to use 
his truck, the plaintiff‘s business operations were disrupted, and as a result 
he incurred a loss of profit.103  The plaintiff brought suit against the dealer 
and the truck manufacturer asserting breach of express warranty and strict 
products liability claims to recover economic loss for the repair of his truck 
and his lost profits.104 
The California Supreme Court determined that the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover damages for lost profits and the plaintiff‘s purchase price of the 
truck under breach of an express warranty.105  However, the court noted 
that had the defendant not warranted the truck, the plaintiff would not have 
been permitted to recover damages under the warranty.106  It is only the 
defendant‘s agreement with the plaintiff that permitted recovery for 
economic loss.107 
Significantly, the court also stated that the plaintiff could not recover 
damages for economic loss based on the strict products liability claim.108  
In doing so, the California Supreme Court explicitly rejected the New 
Jersey Supreme Court‘s holding in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,109 
which permitted a consumer to bring a strict products liability claim against 
a manufacturer for a defective product, even though the plaintiff‘s only 
damage was the product‘s loss of value.110  Therefore, the California 
 
 98. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965). 
 99. Id. at 147. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 147–48. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id. at 148.  The plaintiff was entitled to recover $9240.40 for lost profits and 
$11,659.44 for the payments he made on the truck. Id.  However, the plaintiff‘s claim to 
recover the cost of repair was denied since the trial court found that the plaintiff had not 
proved that the bouncing of the truck caused the accident. Id. 
 106. Id. at 150 (noting that the defendant ―is responsible for these losses only because it 
warranted the truck to be ‗free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use 
and service‘‖). 
 107. Id. at 151 (―Defendant is liable only because of its agreement as defined by its 
continuing practice over eleven months.  Without an agreement, defined by practice or 
otherwise, defendant should not be liable for these commercial losses.‖). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). 
 110. Seely, 403 P.2d at 151. 
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Supreme Court established the economic loss rule by barring the plaintiff‘s 
claim of strict products liability to recover purely economic loss caused by 
a defective product.111 
2.   The U.S. Supreme Court Adopts the Economic Loss Rule 
The economic loss rule gained widespread acceptance when, twenty-one 
years after Seely, the Supreme Court decided East River Steamship Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval Inc.112  The Court applied admiralty law to hold that 
―whether stated in negligence or strict liability, no products-liability claim 
lies in admiralty when the only injury claimed is economic loss.‖113  The 
case arose after a shipbuilder contracted with Transamerica Delaval to 
design, manufacture, and install turbines that would serve as the propulsion 
units for four oil-transporting supertankers.114  The plaintiffs then chartered 
the supertankers.115  After being put into service, the turbines on each of the 
supertankers malfunctioned due to design and manufacturing defects.116  
Purely economic loss resulted since only the products themselves were 
damaged.117  The plaintiffs filed suit based on a tort theory for products 
liability and sought damages for the cost of repair of the supertankers and 
the income lost when the ships were out of service.118 
The Court focused on whether the plaintiffs could bring a claim based on 
a tort cause of action when a defective product purchased in a commercial 
transaction causes purely economic loss or whether such injury is the type 
of harm that should be remedied under contract law.119  The Court adopted 
an approach similar to Seely and held that ―a manufacturer in a commercial 
relationship has no duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability 
theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.‖120  The Court noted that 
contract law, specifically the law of warranty, is the appropriate remedy to 
resolve this type of commercial controversy because the parties may 
bargain for the terms they agree to include in their contract.121  In addition, 
a manufacturer may limit its liability by disclaiming warranties or 
restricting remedies.122  The Court expressed concern that ―contract law 
would drown in a sea of tort‖ if such claims were permitted to be brought 
under products liability theories instead of the law of warranty.123  
 
 111. See id. (―Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer‘s liability is limited to 
damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone.‖). 
 112. 476 U.S. 858 (1986); Fox & Loftus, supra note 7, at 261. 
 113. E. River, 476 U.S. at 876. 
 114. Id. at 859. 
 115. Id. at 859–60. 
 116. Id. at 860–61. 
 117. Id. at 861. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 859. (―[C]harting a course between products liability and contract law, we 
must determine whether injury to a product itself is the kind of harm that should be protected 
by products liability or left entirely to the law of contracts.‖). 
 120. Id. at 871. 
 121. Id. at 872–73. 
 122. Id. at 873. 
 123. Id. at 866. 
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Therefore, the Court prohibited the plaintiffs‘ claims to recover purely 
economic loss based on the tort theory of products liability.124 
C.   The Role of Contracts in Applying the Economic Loss Rule 
For purposes of this Note, application of the economic loss rule entails 
two inquiries:  (1) whether a plaintiff may recover purely economic losses 
caused by a defective product under a tort cause of action; and (2) whether a 
plaintiff may recover purely economic losses based on a tort theory when 
the parties bargain for the allocation of economic loss in their contract.  As 
previously discussed, a majority of jurisdictions answer the first inquiry in 
the negative, absent any physical injury or property damage.125  This 
section, therefore, focuses on the second inquiry concerning the role of 
contracts in applying the economic loss rule.  First, it examines a principal 
justification for why the economic loss rule is used in the contractual privity 
context.  Then, it discusses the consequences of failing to adhere to that 
principal justification.  Finally, it provides a brief introduction to the 
independent duty rule. 
1.   The Boundary-Line Justification:  Protecting the Boundary Line 
Between the Law of Torts and the Law of Contracts 
A principal justification for the economic loss rule is to protect the 
boundary line between tort law and contract law.126  This is known as the 
boundary-line justification.127  According to this rationale, the underlying 
purpose of the economic loss rule is to maintain and enforce the 
―fundamental boundaries of tort and contract law‖ in circumstances where 
both tort and contract theories are implicated.128 
The boundary-line justification can be clearly seen in the products 
liability context.129  When a product injures only itself, it is understood as a 
warranty claim because such harm simply means that the product has failed 
to meet the consumer‘s expectations.130   The quality and value of the 
 
 124. Id. at 876. 
 125. See id. at 868 (noting that Seely established the economic loss rule in products 
liability which is the approach followed by a majority of jurisdictions); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. d (1998); Johnson, supra note 7, at 
526. 
 126. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965) (―The distinction that 
the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for 
economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the ‗luck‘ of one plaintiff in having an 
accident causing physical injury.‖); Johnson, supra note 7, at 546. 
 127. Johnson, supra note 7, at 546. 
 128. E. River, 476 U.S. at 871 (―When a product injures only itself the reasons for 
imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are 
strong.‖); Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 867 (Wash. 2007) (―The economic loss rule 
applies to hold parties to their contract remedies when a loss potentially implicates both tort 
and contract relief.‖); Johnson, supra note 7, at 546. 
 129. Johnson, supra note 7, at 549. 
 130. E. River, 476 U.S. at 872. 
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product is ―precisely the purpose of express and implied warranties.‖131  
Therefore, a claim to recover economic harm from a defective product 
should be brought as a breach of warranty action.132  These types of claims 
for economic harm are outside the realm of tort law because tort law, 
particularly strict products liability, is concerned with deterring 
manufacturers from making dangerous products that actually cause physical 
injury or property damage.133  On the other hand, contract law is concerned 
with holding parties to their terms and remedying purely economic loss.134  
The economic loss rule can be said to maintain the boundary that separates 
tort law from contract law by precluding plaintiffs from advancing tort135 
theories to recover damages for economic loss alone.136  Instead, the 
plaintiff must recover his or her economic loss through contract remedies, if 
any.137 
Although the boundary-line justification is well established in the 
products liability context, the rationale is also pertinent in non-products 
liability cases, especially between commercial parties who bargain for the 
allocation of duties and risks in their contract.138  Such a situation arose in 
Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc.139  The Grynbergs invested approximately $95 
million for 135,000 cattle, which they entrusted to Agri Tech to care for and 
feed.140  The agreement provided that Agri Tech would ―accept and care for 
cattle belonging to [the Grynbergs] in accordance with the customary 
standards of care, responsibility, and good animal husbandry.‖141  The 
Grynbergs became dissatisfied with their investment returns, and sued Agri 
 
 131. Id.; U.C.C. § 2-313 (2012) (express warranty); id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of 
merchantability); id. § 2-315 (warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). 
 132. E. River, 476 U.S. at 872. 
 133. See id. at 870 (―[S]ince by definition no person or other property is damaged, the 
resulting loss is purely economic.  Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through 
an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost 
profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain—
traditionally the core concern of contract law.‖); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
PRODS. LIAB. § 1 cmt. d (1998). 
 134. E. River, 476 U.S. at 872–73 (―Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is 
well suited to commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because the parties 
may set the terms of their own agreements.‖). 
 135. The broad term ―tort‖ is used to show that generally a principal justification behind 
the economic loss rule is to protect the boundary-line between tort law and contract law. See 
Johnson, supra note 7, at 546.  However, many jurisdictions recognize exceptions for torts 
such as fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and defamation, which are primarily about 
economic harm. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 529–34. 
 136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 21 cmt. a (―[P]roducts liability 
law lies at the boundary between tort and contract.  Some categories of loss, including those 
often referred to as ‗pure economic loss,‘ are more appropriately assigned to contract law 
and the remedies set forth in Articles 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code.‖); 
Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–47. 
 137. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–49. 
 138. See generally Grynberg v. Agri Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000); see also 
Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–49. 
 139. 10 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2000); see SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84. 
 140. Grynberg, 10 P.3d at 1268. 
 141. Id. 
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Tech based on, among other claims, negligence and breach of contract.142  
At trial, the jury found for the Grynbergs on their negligence claim but 
found in favor of Agri Tech on the contract claim.143  On appeal, however, 
the Colorado Supreme Court held that the economic loss rule barred the 
Grynbergs from recovering on their negligence claim:  ―This is a classic 
example of a case where the plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages for 
the loss of their bargain with defendants . . . .  An action to recover damages 
for the loss of a bargain is the exclusive province of contract law.‖144  Thus, 
where a breaching party fails to perform under the agreed upon terms of the 
contract and causes the aggrieved party to assert causes of action in tort and 
contract based on the same governing facts, the economic loss rule is 
generally applied to bar the tort claim and protect the bargain made between 
the contracting parties.145 
As exemplified by Grynberg, the boundary-line justification is especially 
relevant where the parties are in contractual privity and have bargained for 
specific terms in their contract.146  In such circumstances, economic loss 
should be remedied under contract law, not tort law, because parties having 
negotiated for specific terms generally should be held to their bargain.147  
Parties to a contract have the opportunity to bargain for the allocation of 
risk by imposing obligations on one another and setting their own terms.148  
Restricting recovery for economic loss to those within the contemplation of 
the parties encourages parties to confidently allocate the risks of economic 
losses during the bargaining process without fear that their negotiations will 
be negated.149  Therefore, a party who wishes to be remedied if they incur 
economic harm must bargain for it.150  Some courts have even stated that it 
is not necessary for a risk of economic loss to be expressly represented in a 
contract before a tort claim to recover that loss will be barred under the 
economic loss rule.151  It is enough that the parties could have accounted for 
 
 142. Id. at 1268–69. 
 143. Id. at 1269. 
 144. Id. at 1270. 
 145. See id.; see also SORENSEN ET AL., supra note 84. 
 146. See Grynberg, 10 P.3d at 1267; see also Craig K. Lawler, Independent Duties and 
Colorado’s Economic Loss Rule—Part I, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 23 (―At the heart of the 
economic loss rule is the model of ‗perfect bargaining‘:  two sophisticated parties bargaining 
at arm‘s length to allocate risk and loss in contract.  When these conditions are present, 
Colorado courts give priority to the contract-based policies of the economic loss rule and 
therefore hold parties exclusively to contract remedies.‖). 
 147. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 546–47. 
 148. See Detroit Edison Co. v. NABCO, Inc., 35 F.3d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1994) (―The 
essence of contract law is the bargain:  parties of equivalent bargaining power negotiate the 
terms of the transaction and each is then entitled to the benefit of the bargain.‖); Johnson, 
supra note 7, at 546–47. 
 149. See Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp., 50 P.3d 866, 871 (Colo. 2002) (―[P]arties must be 
able to confidently allocate risks and costs during their bargaining without fear that 
unanticipated liability may arise in the future, effectively negating the parties‘ efforts to 
build these cost considerations into the contract.‖). 
 150. Johnson, supra note 7, at 547. 
 151. See e.g., Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 779 A.2d 67, 70 (Vt. 2001) 
(―Contract principles, on the other hand, are generally more appropriate for determining 
claims for consequential damages that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their 
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the risk of such loss.152  As such, courts have applied the economic loss rule 
to preclude plaintiffs who had the opportunity to bargain for the allocation 
of risk of economic harm from asserting tort theories to recover for their 
economic loss.153 
2.   Failing to Protect the Boundary Line:  Drowning in a Sea of Tort 
Several courts have recognized the consequences of not policing the 
boundary line between tort law and contract law.154  Allowing tort and 
contract remedies to overlap would cause ―certainty and predictability in 
allocating risk [to] decrease and impede future business activity.‖155  
Furthermore, permitting tort liability to expand to include purely economic 
damages would cause parties to be exposed to ―liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.‖156  The 
Supreme Court has even asserted that ―if this development were allowed to 
progress too far, contract law would drown in a sea of tort.‖157 
3.   Independent Duties Separate and Apart from the Contract 
In articulating the economic loss rule, some courts have focused on the 
source of the duty allegedly violated.158  These courts hold that the 
economic loss rule does not apply to bar tort claims for economic harm if 
the defendant breached a duty that was independent of the contract.159  For 
example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has stated:  ―[T]he question 
 
agreement.‖ (quoting Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 
1985))); Alejandre v. Bull, 153 P.3d 864, 866 (Wash. 2007) (―There is no requirement that a 
risk of loss must be expressly allocated in a contract before a tort claim based on that loss 
will be precluded under the economic loss rule.‖); see also 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, 
§ 515 (―Some courts have gone much, much further, refusing to entertain tort claims when 
the plaintiff could have but did not actually contract about a matter.‖). 
 152. Springfield Hydroelectric, 779 A.2d at 70; Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 866; 3 DOBBS ET 
AL., supra note 17, § 515. 
 153. Springfield Hydroelectric, 779 A.2d at 70; Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 866; 3 DOBBS ET 
AL., supra note 17, § 515. 
 154. See infra notes 155–57 and accompanying text. 
 155. Alejandre, 153 P.3d at 868. 
 156. Id. at 868 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931)); see 
also E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 (1986) 
(―Permitting recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could make a 
manufacturer liable for vast sums.  It would be difficult for a manufacturer to take into 
account the expectations of persons downstream who may encounter its product.  In this 
case, for example, if the charterers—already one step removed from the transaction—were 
permitted to recover their economic losses, then the companies that subchartered the ships 
might claim their economic losses from the delays, and the charterers‘ customers also might 
claim their economic losses, and so on.‖). 
 157. E. River, 476 U.S. at 866. 
 158. Johnson, supra note 7, at 566; see infra notes 160–74 and accompanying text. 
 159. A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass‘n, 114 P.3d 862, 866 (Colo. 
2005); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 
S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995) (―In most instances, a negligence action will not lie when the 
parties are in privity of contract.  When, however, there is a special relationship between the 
alleged tortfeasor and the injured party not arising in contract, the breach of that duty of care 
will support a tort action.‖). 
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of whether the plaintiff may maintain an action in tort for purely economic 
loss turns on the determination of the source of the duty plaintiff claims the 
defendant owed.‖160  If a breach of duty arises under a contract between the 
parties, any action to recover economic harm must be remedied under 
contract, not tort law.161  However, where the breach of duty arises 
independently of any contract duties between the parties, an action may be 
brought in tort law.162 
The Colorado Supreme Court has also adopted a similar approach to 
applying the economic loss rule:  ―Where there exists a duty of care 
independent of any contractual obligations, the economic loss rule has no 
application and does not bar a plaintiff‘s tort claim because the claim is 
based on a recognized independent duty of care and thus falls outside the 
scope of the [doctrine].‖163  In other words, the economic loss rule is 
applied if the only breach is a breach of contractual duty;164 however, 
where the breach arises independently of any contractual duty between the 
parties, the economic loss rule is not applied.165 
An independent duty of care may occur when the duty did not arise out 
of the contract and is not intertwined with a contractual duty of 
performance.166  For the tort duty to be actionable, it therefore must be 
separate from the contract.167  A professional malpractice claim is an 
example.168  In such a case, a contract creates a special relationship between 
the parties and the duties arising from the relationship may be enforced in 
tort.169 
Florida courts had also followed a contractual privity form of the 
economic loss rule before the state‘s highest court rendered its decision in 
Tiara and held that the economic loss rule applied exclusively in the 
products liability context.170  In determining whether a duty is independent 
of the contract, the Florida courts generally turned to the terms of the 
contract bargained for by the parties.171  If the express terms of the contract 
(and in some Florida jurisdictions the opportunity to bargain for terms), 
addressed or incorporated a certain duty, it arguably was not 
independent.172  However, if the plaintiff could show that the defendant 
owed a duty separate from the contract that as a matter of public policy 
 
 160. Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing, 463 S.E.2d at 88. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. A.C. Excavating, 114 P.3d at 866. 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 652. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. § 653. 
 169. Id. §§ 652–53. 
 170. Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 402–04 (Fla. 
2013). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. 
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cannot be contracted away, then the plaintiff may have had a cause of action 
based in tort law.173 
II.   EXPAND OR CONTRACT?:  FLORIDA STRUGGLES 
TO DEFINE THE LIMIT OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
As Part I discussed, the economic loss rule is a broad rule under which 
various applications exist.  This part examines the various applications of 
the doctrine in Florida case law, Florida‘s expansion of the rule beyond the 
realm of products liability, and the Florida Supreme Court‘s concern of an 
expansive doctrine, ultimately prompting the court to contract the 
application of the rule exclusively to products liability.  Part II.A discusses 
the development and expansion of the economic loss rule in Florida case 
law prior to Tiara.  Part II.B examines the Florida Supreme Court‘s concern 
with an expansive doctrine.  Finally, Part II.C. looks at Tiara, which 
restricts application of the doctrine based solely on whether the case 
involves a defective product. 
A.   The Development and Expansion of the Economic Loss Rule in Florida 
This section focuses on the adoption, development, and expansion of the 
economic loss rule in the State of Florida.  To understand Florida‘s decision 
to roll back the economic loss rule exclusively in the products liability 
context, it is helpful to trace Florida‘s development of the doctrine before 
the state‘s highest court rendered its decision in Tiara.  First, this section 
discusses Florida‘s adoption of the economic loss rule in products liability.  
Second, it examines the expansion of Florida‘s application of the doctrine 
in non-products liability, specifically in the context of services.  Lastly, it 
looks at how contractual privity affected the state‘s application of the 
doctrine. 
1.   Florida Establishes the Economic Loss Rule in Products Liability 
The Florida Supreme Court adopted its initial version of the economic 
loss rule in the seminal case of Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp.174  Florida Power & Light contracted with Westinghouse to 
 
 173. See id. 
 174. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).  Although the Florida Supreme Court did not 
specifically address the economic loss rule until 1987, some Florida district courts of appeal 
were already employing the doctrine to preclude recovery for pure economic loss in products 
liability cases. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1984) (holding in a defective products case that ―the law of torts affords no cause of action 
for the plaintiff . . . to recover for its purely economic losses in this case‖); Cedars of Leb. 
Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distribs. of Am., Inc., 444 So. 2d 1068, 1072 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1984) (precluding a hospital‘s claim for strict products liability to recover its economic 
loss caused by defective x-ray equipment); Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 
2d 574, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (prohibiting plaintiff from bringing a negligence 
claim when herbicides failed to perform as expected and stating that tort law does not 
recognize a duty to manufacture only products that meet the economic expectations of 
consumers, but recognizing such duty under contract law where the manufacturer assumes 
the duty as part of his bargain with the purchaser). 
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purchase two nuclear steam supply systems, including six steam 
generators.175  After allegedly discovering leaks in the six steam generators, 
Florida Power & Light sued Westinghouse, claiming that Westinghouse 
was liable for negligence and breach of express warranties in the 
contract.176  Florida Power & Light sought damages for, among other 
things, the cost of repair and inspection of the steam generators.177 
The Southern District of Florida denied Westinghouse‘s motion for 
partial summary judgment on the breach of warranty claim.178  However, 
the trial court granted Westinghouse‘s motion for partial summary 
judgment on the negligence claim, concluding that Florida law bars 
recovery of economic loss without any claim of personal injury or other 
property damage.179 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions to the Florida 
Supreme Court: 
 (1) Whether Florida law permits a buyer under a contract for goods to 
recover economic losses in tort without a claim for personal injury or 
property damage to property other than the allegedly defective goods. 
 (2) If Florida law precludes recovery for economic loss in tort without 
a claim for personal injury or property damage to other property, whether 
this rule should be applied retroactively in this case.180 
The Florida Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative.181  
It relied primarily on East River, Seely, and three Florida district court of 
appeal cases182 to hold that contract principles are better suited than tort 
principles to remedy purely economic loss.183  Thus, the court, quoting the 
reasoning in Seely, agreed with Westinghouse that the majority approach in 
the United States bars recovery of economic damages based on a tort cause 
of action where there is no property damage or personal injury.184  
Furthermore, the court reiterated the proposition in East River that in a 
commercial relationship, ―a manufacturer . . . has no duty under either a 
negligence or strict products liability theory to prevent a product from 
injuring itself.‖185  The court concluded that economic risks, such as 
product value and quality, should be negotiated between parties to a 
 
 175. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 785 F.2d 952, 953 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 
1987). 
 182. See supra note 174. 
 183. Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902. 
 184. Id. at 900–02. 
 185. Id. at 901 (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
871 (1986)). 
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contract.186  Thus, warranty law should control any claims for purely 
economic loss asserted by a party to a contract.187 
In answering the second question (whether the economic loss rule should 
be applied retroactively in the instant case), the court stated that the 
economic loss rule ―is not a new principle of law in Florida.‖188  Rather, 
―the economic loss rule has a long, historic basis originating with the privity 
doctrine, which precluded recovery of economic losses outside a contractual 
setting.‖189  Therefore, the court held that the economic loss rule should be 
applied to the instant case not retroactively, but as a matter of existing 
law.190 
2.   Florida Expands the Scope of the Economic Loss Rule 
to Non-Products Liability 
Three months after the Florida Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
Westinghouse, the court decided AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & 
Telegraph Co.,191 where it applied the economic loss rule to preclude a 
purchaser of services from recovering economic loss in negligence.192  
AFM contracted with Southern Bell for advertising services in the yellow 
pages.193  At the time of the contract, AFM was considering moving its 
office.194  However, such a move would cause significantly higher toll 
charges.195  As a result, Southern Bell agreed that if AFM moved and 
changed its phone number, it would provide a referral service to avoid the 
higher toll charges.196  Thus, in the event callers telephoned AFM‘s old 
number, they would be referred to their new number by a taped voice.197  
The problem began when the yellow pages were distributed with AFM‘s 
old number.198  Furthermore, Southern Bell issued AFM‘s old number to 
another customer, which caused a disconnection with the referral service.199  
 
 186. Id.  The parties to the contract were commercial entities engaged in a large 
commercial transaction. Id. at 902.  It is unclear whether the court‘s holding would have 
been different had one party to the contract been a consumer.  Nevertheless, such inquiry is 
beyond the scope of this Note, as this Note argues for application of the economic loss rule 
in a context similar to Westinghouse. 
 187. Id. at 901. 
 188. Id. at 902.  Although not explicitly stated, the court seems to be referencing the three 
decisions of the district courts of appeal.  However, this case is the first time that Florida‘s 
highest court articulated its adoption of the economic loss rule. See supra note 174 and 
accompanying text. 
 189. Westinghouse, 510 So. 2d at 902. 
 190. See id. 
 191. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987). 
 192. Id. at 181–82. 
 193. AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 796 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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The connection to the referral service was eventually reestablished; 
however, it was later mistakenly disconnected a second time.200 
AFM filed suit against Southern Bell based on negligence and breach of 
contract and sought damages for its purely economic losses.201  At the trial, 
AFM offered evidence that the referral service Southern Bell had agreed to 
provide had been prematurely disconnected.202  AFM also produced expert 
testimony that showed it lost $21,800 in profits because of Southern Bell‘s 
failure to properly maintain the referral service.203  After AFM had 
introduced all of its evidence, AFM‘s counsel decided to withdraw all of the 
contract claims and proceed only on its negligence claim.204 
The jury returned a verdict for AFM, awarding the company both 
compensatory and punitive damages.205  Southern Bell appealed after the 
trial court denied its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and 
in the alternative a motion for a new trial.206 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified three questions207 to the Florida 
Supreme Court, which consolidated the questions into one:  ―Does Florida 
permit a purchaser of services to recover economic losses in tort without a 
claim for personal injury or property damage?‖208  The court answered the 
question in the negative, thereby expanding its holding in Westinghouse to 
include services.209 
In reaching its decision, the court noted the obvious distinction between 
Westinghouse, where the court responded to a certified question concerning 
the purchase of goods, and the instant case, which involved the purchase of 
services.210  The court also emphasized that the contract between AFM and 
Southern Bell ―defined the limitation of liability through bargaining, risk 
acceptance, and compensation.‖211  Therefore, the court stated that there 
must be a tort independent of the breach of contract to recover in 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  AFM initially filed its lawsuit against Southern Bell in a Florida state court, 
asserting claims for both negligence and breach of contract. Id.  The case was later removed 
to the Southern District of Florida. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. The three questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit were: 
(1) Can a plaintiff suing exclusively in tort recover lost profits? 
If the answer to question 1 is yes, 
(2) Can negligent or willful breach of contract alone 
constitute an independent tort? 
If the answer to question 2 is yes, 
(3) Can such a tort be the basis of an award of punitive damages if the other 
criteria for awarding punitive damages are met? 
Id. at 1469. 
 208. AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 180 (Fla. 1987). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. at 181. 
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negligence.212  AFM failed to prove that its negligence claim was distinct 
from the breach of contract.213  Therefore, the court concluded ―that 
without some conduct resulting in personal injury or property damage, there 
can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach which would 
justify a tort claim solely for economic losses.‖214 
In rendering its decision, the court addressed a seeming inconsistency 
with its holding in a prior case, A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham.215  In Moyer, 
the court allowed the plaintiff to recover purely economic losses based on a 
negligence theory even though the plaintiff did not suffer any personal 
injury or property damage.216  The court, however, did not overrule Moyer, 
but distinguished the case by asserting that the Moyer plaintiff was not a 
party to or third-party beneficiary of the contract with the defendant.217  
Thus, since the plaintiff in Moyer did not have a contract under which he 
could recover his loss, unlike the plaintiff in AFM, the court permitted 
recovery for economic losses.218 
Westinghouse, AFM, and Moyer seemed to suggest that the economic 
loss rule applied where the parties were in contractual privity, allowing the 
parties to negotiate and allocate risks.219  However, six years later the 
Florida Supreme Court held that the economic loss rule applied regardless 
of whether the parties are in contractual privity in Casa Clara 
Condominium Ass’n v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.220 
3.   Florida Applies the Economic Loss Rule 
Regardless of Contractual Privity 
After expanding the economic loss rule to cover services in AFM, the 
Florida Supreme Court established that the doctrine would apply 
irrespective of whether the parties were in contractual privity.221  In Casa 
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 181–82. 
 215. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).  In Moyer, the Florida Supreme Court answered the 
certified question of whether a general contractor could sue a supervising architect or 
engineer for negligent preparation of plans when the architect or engineer was not in direct 
privity with the general contractor. Id. at 398. 
 216. AFM, 515 So. 2d at 181. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id.  In addition, to the lack of a contract under which the general contractor could 
recover, pivotal to the court‘s decision was the supervisory nature of the relationship 
between the architect and the general contractor. Id.  As the court stated: 
We based our decision on the fact that the supervisory responsibilities vested in the 
architect carried with it a concurrent duty not to injure foreseeable parties not 
beneficiaries of the contract.  We declined in that case to find a basis for the 
negligence claim under the contract itself, absent a clear intent manifested in the 
contract. Since there was no contract under which the general contractor could 
recover his loss, we concluded he did have a cause of action in tort. 
Id. 
 219. See id. at 181; Fla. Power & Light v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 
(Fla. 1987). 
 220. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993). 
 221. See id. at 1248. 
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Clara, the court was presented with the issue of whether homeowners could 
recover for purely economic losses from a concrete supplier based on a 
negligence theory.222  The homeowners owned condominium units and 
small homes that were built using concrete supplied by Charley Toppino & 
Sons, Inc.223  The homeowners alleged that the concrete was defective and 
as a result had damaged their homes.224  They brought suit against Toppino 
for breach of implied warranty, products liability, negligence, and violation 
of the building code.225 
Relying on its prior decisions, the court stated that contract law was more 
appropriate than tort law for recovering economic loss without any physical 
injury or property damage.226  The court explained that the homeowners 
suffered an ―economic disappointment‖ since the home failed to meet their 
expectations.227  Noting that there are protections228 for purchasers of 
homes, the court stated that the protections must be ―sufficient when 
compared with the mischief that could be caused by allowing tort recovery 
for purely economic losses.‖229  Therefore, the court applied the economic 
loss rule even though the homeowners and Toppino were not in contractual 
privity.230 
B.   Concerns of an Expansive Application of the Economic Loss Rule 
According to Westinghouse, AFM, and Casa Clara, the Florida economic 
loss rule provides that generally, principles of contract law, not tort law, are 
the appropriate means to remedy claims of economic loss where there is no 
physical injury or property damage.231  Following these three cases, the 
Florida Supreme Court expressed concern that the economic loss rule had 
 
 222. Id. at 1245. 
 223. Id.  The homeowners lacked contractual privity with Toppino since they purchased 
their homes from developers who purchased the concrete from Toppino. See id. at 1248 
(Barkett, J., concurring). 
 224. Id. at 1245 (majority opinion). Allegedly, the concrete contained too much salt, 
which caused the steel in the concrete to rust and crack. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1247.  The court further rejected the homeowners‘ suggestion that the 
defective concrete caused property damage other than to the product itself. Id.  The 
homeowners contended that the products they purchased were the separate items of building 
material, rather than the homes themselves. Id.  The court disagreed, stating that the 
homeowners bargained for and purchased the completed homes, not the separate materials 
used to build those homes. Id.  The concrete was an essential part of the finished product and 
did not harm property other than the product itself. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. The court noted that protections for homebuyers include statutory warranties, the 
warranty of habitability, the duty of sellers to disclose known defects, ability of purchasers to 
inspect houses for defects, and the power to bargain over price. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. See id. at 1248. 
 231. See id. at 1247; AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 
1987); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 
1987). 
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become overly expansive.232  For example, in Moransais v. Heathman233 
the court observed that the economic loss rule was intended to limit actions 
in the context of products liability.234  In addition, in Comptech 
International, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd.,235 the court noted the 
confusion surrounding the application of the rule and stated that ―[h]ad the 
courts adhered to these requirements (a product, the product damaging 
itself, and economic losses), the confusion that has abounded in this area of 
the law would have been minimized.‖236  The court went on to 
acknowledge that its pronouncements on the economic loss rule had been 
criticized.237  Finally, in Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. 
American Aviation, Inc.238 the court reiterated its concern with the over 
expansion of the economic loss rule and how several justices supported 
expressly limiting the economic loss rule to products liability cases.239 
In Moransais, Comptech, and American Aviation, the Florida Supreme 
Court expressed its concern with the application of the economic loss rule 
and its desire to limit the rule in the products liability context.240  However, 
despite the court‘s explicit concern, it did not restrict the scope of the 
economic loss rule.241 
C.   Returning the Economic Loss Rule to Its Roots 
In 2013, the Florida Supreme Court took the ―final step‖ and held that the 
economic loss rule applies exclusively in products liability cases.242  This 
section examines the recent Tiara decision, the dissenting opinions, and 
what it may mean for future litigants. 
 
 232. See Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 406 (Fla. 
2013) (―For some time . . . this Court has been concerned with what it perceived as an over-
expansion of the economic loss rule.‖). 
 233. 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999). 
 234. Id. at 983 (―[T]he rule was primarily intended to limit actions in the product liability 
context, and its application should generally be limited to those contexts or situations where 
the policy considerations are substantially identical to those underlying the product liability-
type analysis.‖). 
 235. 753 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1999). 
 236. Id. at 1224. 
 237. Id.  One Florida practitioner, Paul J. Schwiep, criticized the ―confoundingly 
expanding legal doctrine‖ on a variety of bases and noted that ―judges, lawyers, and 
commercial clients alike are all desperately struggling to define the parameters of the 
economic loss doctrine.‖ Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak:  The Monster 
That Ate Commercial Torts, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1995, at 34. 
 238. 891 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2004). 
 239. Id. at 542. 
 240. See Tiara Condo. Ass‘n v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 110 So. 3d 399, 407 (Fla. 
2013) (―[I]n Moransais, Comptech, and American Aviation, this Court clearly expressed its 
desire to return the economic loss rule to its intended purpose—to limit actions in the 
products liability context.‖). 
 241. See id. at 407 (―[W]e left intact a number of exceptions that continue the rule‘s 
unprincipled expansion.  We simply did not go far enough.‖). 
 242. Id. (―[W]e now take this final step and hold that the economic loss rule applies only 
in the products liability context.  We thus recede from our prior rulings to the extent that they 
have applied the economic loss rule to cases other than products liability.‖). 
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1.   Workable and Wise Only in Products Liability Cases 
Retreating from years of precedent that applied the economic loss rule to 
a variety of contractual contexts, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that 
the doctrine applies exclusively in the products liability context.243  The 
case involved an insurance broker retained by Tiara Condominium 
Association to obtain condominium insurance coverage.244  The broker 
secured a policy for a loss limit of approximately $50 million.245  As a 
result of two hurricanes, Tiara sustained significant losses as a result of the 
damage.246  The insurance broker assured Tiara that the loss limit on the 
insurance coverage was per occurrence (which means that since there were 
two hurricanes, Tiara would be entitled to approximately $100 million, 
instead of the aggregate amount of $50 million), and so Tiara underwent 
costly remediation efforts.247  However, when Tiara requested payment 
from the insurance company, it claimed that the loss limit was only $50 
million in the aggregate and not per occurrence.248  Tiara and the insurance 
company eventually settled for about $89 million.249  However, Tiara had 
spent more than $100 million in its remediation efforts, and so it filed suit 
against the insurance broker alleging breach of contract, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.250 
The Florida Supreme Court was faced with answering a certified 
question from the Eleventh Circuit.251  The court rephrased the certified 
question as:  ―Does the economic loss rule bar an insured‘s suit against an 
insurance broker where the parties are in contractual privity with one 
another and the damages sought are solely for economic losses?‖252  Before 
answering the question in the negative and categorically holding that the 
economic loss rule is exclusively limited to products liability cases, the 
court first reviewed the history of the doctrine.253 
The court divided its discussion by focusing on two types of 
circumstances where the economic loss rule had been applied:  cases 
involving contractual privity and products liability cases.254  The court 
noted that the contractual privity form of the economic loss rule is designed 
to preclude the parties from circumventing the bargain that they have made 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 400. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id.  The Eleventh Circuit originally certified to the Florida Supreme Court the 
following question:  ―Does an insurance broker provide a ‗professional service‘ such that the 
insurance broker is unable to successfully assert the economic loss rule as a bar to tort claims 
seeking economic damages that arise from the contractual relationship between the insurance 
broker and the insured?‖ Id. 
 253. Id. at 401–02. 
 254. Id. at 402–06. 
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to allocate risks and losses specified in their contract by bringing a tort 
claim for economic loss.255  Under the contractual privity version, a 
plaintiff is barred from asserting tort actions to recover purely economic 
losses where the damages sought in tort are the same as those for the breach 
of contract.256  In other words, a tort action is not viable where a defendant 
has not breached a duty separate and apart from the breach of contract.257  
The reason for precluding a plaintiff from asserting tort actions in such 
circumstances is because contract principles are ―generally more 
appropriate for determining remedies for consequential damages that the 
parties have, or could have, addressed in their contractual agreement.‖258 
After reviewing the application of the economic loss rule in contractual 
contexts, the majority opinion turned to the doctrine‘s origin and original 
purpose.259  According to the court, since the economic loss rule originated 
in products liability, the doctrine‘s original intent was to bar tort claims 
solely in products liability cases.260  The majority opinion reiterated its 
concern that the doctrine had created ―a legacy of unprincipled 
expansion.‖261  The court noted how it first articulated its concern with the 
expansion of the doctrine in Moransais, then in Comptech, and yet again 
five years later in American Aviation.262  The court stated that it ―simply did 
not go far enough‖ in those cases.263  Recognizing that the expansion of the 
economic loss rule had become ―unwise and unworkable in practice,‖ the 
court limited  the doctrine‘s application exclusively to products liability 
cases, receding from its use in the contractual privity context.264  Therefore, 
the court answered the rephrased certified question in the negative, 
rendering the economic loss rule inapplicable to bar Tiara‘s tort claims.265 
2.   The Dissenting Opinions:  Workable and Wise in Products Liability 
and Contractual Privity Cases 
The two dissenting opinions questioned the use of the economic loss rule 
solely in the products liability context.266  Justice Canady‘s dissent focused 
on the court‘s continuous application of the doctrine in contractual privity 
 
 255. Id. at 402. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 403–07. 
 260. Id. at 407.  The concurring opinion also explained that the original intent of the 
economic loss rule applies only to products liability cases. Id. at 409 (Pariente, J., 
concurring) (stating that the economic loss rule is ―a doctrine that arose in the torts context to 
serve a specific purpose—to curb potentially unbounded liability following the adoption of 
strict products liability‖). 
 261. Id. at 406 (majority opinion). 
 262. Id. at 406–07. 
 263. Id. at 407. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. See id. at 410 (Polston, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 411 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
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contexts to prevent ―contract law from ‗drown[ing] in a sea of tort.‘‖267  
The dissent noted that the underlying assumption of the economic loss rule 
is to prevent parties to a contract from circumventing the allocation of risk 
and losses specified in the contract by asserting an action to recover 
economic loss in tort.268  According to Justice Canady‘s dissent, the 
majority failed to explain why the economic loss rule is workable and wise 
in the products liability context, but unworkable and unwise in the broader 
context of contract-based relationships.269 
According to then-Chief Justice Polston‘s dissent, the court should have 
used its precedent to answer the original certified question from the 
Eleventh Circuit in the negative.270  The initial certified question hinged on 
whether insurance brokers provided a ―professional service.‖271  If 
insurance brokers provided professional services, then the economic loss 
rule could not be applied to bar Tiara‘s tort claims.272  Chief Justice Polston 
reasoned that under Florida case law insurance brokers do not provide 
professional services,273 and therefore, the defendant/insurance broker may 
successfully assert the economic loss rule as a defense against tort 
liability.274 
3.   Barred or Not Barred? 
According to Justice Pariente‘s concurring opinion, even though the 
contractual privity form of the economic loss rule provided an easy way to 
bar tort claims intertwined with breach of contract claims, ―it is neither a 
necessary nor a principled mechanism for doing so.‖275  If the defendant 
does not owe the plaintiff any duty apart from that created by the contract, 
the tort claim would fail under ―basic contractual principles.‖276  According 
to the concurring opinion, therefore, the Tiara decision will not have a 
substantial impact because it merely alters the means by which the court 
will dismiss alleged tort claims that arise in a contractual setting.277  In 
other words, instead of relying on the economic loss rule to dismiss tort 
 
 267. Id. at 413 (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica 
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986)). 
 268. Id. at 412. 
 269. Id. at 413. 
 270. Id. at 410 (Polston, C.J., dissenting). 
 271. See id. 
 272. Id. at 411. 
 273. Id. (reasoning that insurance agents, who are not considered ―professional for 
purposes of the professional malpractice statute of limitations,‖ are like insurance brokers 
and the definition of ―professional‖ requires at least a four-year college degree, which is not 
necessary to become a licensed insurance broker). 
 274. See id. at 410–11. 
 275. Id. at 409 (Pariente, J., concurring). 
 276. Id. at 408–09. 
 277. Id. at 408 (―Our decision is neither a monumental upsetting of Florida law nor an 
expansion of tort law at the expense of contract principles.  To the contrary, the majority 
merely clarifies that the economic loss rule was always intended to apply only to products 
liability cases.‖). 
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claims in contractual contexts, the court will employ ―basic contractual 
principles.‖278 
However, according to Chief Justice Polston‘s dissenting opinion, the 
majority‘s elimination of the use of the doctrine when the parties are in 
contractual privity ―greatly expand[s] tort claims and remedies available 
without deference to contract claims.‖279  Moreover, according to Justice 
Canady, by restricting the economic loss rule solely to the products liability 
context, the court ―face[s] the prospect of every breach of contract claim 
being accompanied by a tort claim.‖280  In other words, plaintiffs will 
attempt to bolster their amount of recoverable damages by asserting tort 
claims that ordinarily would have been barred under precedent prior to 
Tiara.281 
III.   REDEFINING THE LIMIT OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE 
As Part II has shown, Florida courts have struggled to define the limit of 
the economic loss rule.  As a way to overcome this struggle, the Florida 
Supreme Court adopted a bright-line approach by limiting the scope of the 
doctrine exclusively to the products liability context.  Part III of this Note 
argues that such a restriction of the doctrine is too narrow.  This Note 
contends that the economic loss rule is not just for products liability and 
thus the limited scope of Florida‘s economic loss rule should be redefined 
to include contractual privity cases.  Specifically, the economic loss rule 
should be applied in situations where sophisticated parties engage in arms-
length negotiations, bargaining for the allocation of risk and loss in their 
contract.  Part III.A argues that applying the economic loss rule pursuant to 
Florida‘s products liability rule does not protect the boundary line between 
 
 278. Id. at 409 (―The majority‘s decision . . . merely explains that it is common law 
principles of contract, rather than the economic loss rule, that [dismisses tort claims 
interconnected with breach of contract claims].‖). 
 279. Id. at 411 (Polston, C.J., dissenting). 
 280. Id. at 414 (Canady, J., dissenting). 
 281. See id. at 410 (Polston, C.J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Polston‘s dissent contends 
that the majority‘s decision ―make[s] available a wide arsenal of tort claims previously 
barred by the economic loss rule.‖ Id. at 410 n.10.  Among the types of cases that Chief 
Justice Polston cites as previously barred by the economic loss rule but now available as tort 
claims include:  Geico Casualty Co. v. Arce, 333 F. App‘x 396, 398 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(applying Florida‘s economic loss rule to bar civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims arising out of a breach of an insurance policy); Mount Sinai 
Medical Center of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Heidrick & Struggles, Inc., 188 F. App‘x 966, 969 
(11th Cir. 2006) (applying Florida‘s economic loss rule to bar fraudulent misrepresentation 
claims and holding that the hospital‘s remedy for alleged breach of search contract was for 
breach of contract, not a tort action); Royal Surplus Lines Inc. v. Coachman Industries, Inc., 
184 F. App‘x 894, 902 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying Florida‘s economic loss rule to bar 
insurer‘s tort actions which were based on insured‘s failure to provide information under the 
terms of a contract); Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Avior Technologies, Inc., 990 So. 2d 532, 538 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (barring negligence claim against aircraft repair company and 
holding plaintiffs were bound by the service agreement for the repairs and its limitation of 
damages provision); Taylor v. Maness, 941 So. 2d 559, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) 
(barring recovery for fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims arising 
out of defendants alleged failure to perform under the contract). Tiara, 110 So. 3d 410 n.10 
(Polston, C.J., dissenting). 
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tort law and contract law because it fails to protect the bargain for the 
allocation of economic loss made between sophisticated parties.  Part III.B 
offers an approach to determine the application of the economic loss rule 
specifically where sophisticated parties bargain for the allocation of risk and 
economic loss in their contract.  In such a context, the economic loss rule 
should always be applied, unless the contract says otherwise. 
A.   The Products Liability Rule Is Insufficient to Protect 
the Boundary Line Between Tort Law and Contract Law 
Products liability cases are a clear way to understand the boundary-line 
justification:  manufacturers should be held accountable under tort theories 
where their products cause physical harm or property damage because tort 
law is concerned with remedying such types of harm; on the other hand, 
where the defective product causes harm in the form of pure economic loss, 
manufacturers should not be held liable under tort law because such harm is 
more appropriately remedied through contract or warranty law.282  Thus, 
courts apply the economic loss rule to preclude plaintiffs from recovering 
economic loss under a tort theory where the proper redress for such type of 
harm is the province of contract law.283 
However, the question still remains if (and to what extent) the doctrine 
should be applied outside of the products liability context.284  To a great 
extent, this question turns on the boundary-line justification.285  
Specifically, what does ―tort law‖ mean when courts and legal authorities 
assert that a principle justification for the economic loss rule is to protect 
the boundary line between tort law and contract law?286  Therefore, how 
broadly ―tort law‖ is defined is crucial to determine the proper scope of the 
economic loss rule‘s application.  A narrow reading of the boundary-line 
justification posits that the economic loss rule protects the boundary line 
between products liability law and contract law.287  Under such a reading, 
the boundary-line justification does not protect all of tort law but rather a 
particular subset, i.e., products liability.288  If this is the proper reading of 
the boundary-line function, it is easy to see how the economic loss rule 
should apply exclusively in products liability cases.289 
On the other hand, if the boundary-line justification is defined broadly as 
a means to protect the boundary line between tort law and contract law, 
then it becomes more difficult to assert that the economic loss rule was 
intended to apply exclusively in products liability cases.290  Even though 
the economic loss rule originated in the context of products liability, the 
 
 282. See supra notes 129–37 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.A.2.a–b. 
 283. See supra notes 108–24 and accompanying text; see also Part I.A.4 (outlining the 
benefits of recovering economic losses through tort law as opposed to contract law). 
 284. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 286. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 287. See supra notes 260–66 and accompanying text. 
 288. See supra notes 260–66 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 260–65 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 138–53, 267–74 and accompanying text. 
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boundary-line justification should be interpreted so that the doctrine‘s scope 
is broader.291  As articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court, underlying 
the necessity for the economic loss rule is the ability for parties to 
confidently allocate the costs and risks of economic losses in their 
bargain.292  It should be irrelevant whether the case involves a defective 
product because the focus should be to protect the bargain made between 
the parties.293  Part of the boundary-line justification is to respect the 
bargain for allocation of economic loss between parties.294  If a person 
wishes to be protected from economic harm, he or she must bargain for 
protection and pay the price of securing those benefits.295  In other words, 
the economic loss rule encourages parties to confidently allocate the costs 
and risks that may arise without fear that their efforts in the bargaining 
process will later be negated.296  Moreover, the doctrine ensures respect for 
the bargaining process by preventing parties from asserting tort theories in 
their lawsuits to recoup economic losses, thereby voiding the careful 
decisions made during negotiations.297 
Although this Note acknowledges that application of the economic loss 
rule in products liability is appropriate, it is inappropriate to restrict its 
application exclusively to cases that involve a defective product because it 
circumvents the allocation of economic loss that parties bargained for in 
their contract.298  For example, suppose in negotiating terms for a contract 
involving services (or any non-products-related matter), two corporations of 
equal bargaining power negotiate for a specific remedy in the event one 
party sustains economic loss.  The remedy says that in the event the 
purchaser of services suffers economic loss as a result of the seller‘s 
negligently rendered services, the purchaser may not assert any tort claims 
against the seller.  Rather, the purchaser is limited to a $50,000 remedy.  
Suppose the purchaser suffers economic loss in the amount of $100,000 as a 
result of the seller‘s negligence in its performance of the contract.  The 
purchaser sues the seller for breach of contract and negligence.  Even 
though the parties specifically bargained for the allocation of economic 
loss, under Florida‘s products liability rule the purchaser is not barred by 
the economic loss rule from asserting its negligence claim.299 
This, however, does not mean that the purchaser will recover the other 
$50,000.300  This example is merely intended to show how Florida‘s 
products liability rule weakens the practical force of the economic loss 
 
 291. See supra notes 256–60 and accompanying text; see also Town of Alma v. AZCO 
Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000) (―Although originally born from products 
liability law, the application of the economic loss rule is broader, because it serves to 
maintain a distinction between contract and tort law.‖). 
 292. Town of Alma, 10 P.3d at 1262; see supra notes 144–46, 149 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 146–53, 267–69 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 146–53, 267–69 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 146–53, 268–69, 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 261–67, 281 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 275–78 and accompanying text. 
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rule.301  In jurisdictions that follow Florida‘s lead, defendants may no 
longer rely on the economic loss rule as a means to protect against tort 
liability in non-products liability cases.302 
In the example discussed above, this Note contends that, with respect to 
sophisticated parties, such claims should always be barred by the economic 
loss rule, unless the contract specified that such causes of action may be 
asserted.  The idea is that sophisticated parties can be assumed to engage in 
perfect bargaining with equal bargaining power and levels of skill to carry 
out the negotiations.303  If the corporation would like to be able to recover 
economic loss based on a tort theory, the corporation must bargain for it as 
a term of the contract.304  Thus, this Note posits that absolute deference to 
the contract is the best way to respect the bargaining process for 
sophisticated parties, a standard further explored in the next section.305 
B.   Redefining the Limit to Include Sophisticated Parties 
in Contractual Privity 
The economic loss rule‘s justification of preventing parties from 
circumventing the allocation of economic loss is arguably most necessary in 
situations where sophisticated parties to a contract negotiate in arms-length 
transactions, bargaining for the allocation of risk and economic loss in their 
contract.306  In such circumstances, Florida courts should take a different 
approach by looking beyond the origins of the economic loss rule to the 
terms of the contract.  This approach requires absolute deference to the 
contract, as outlined below. 
If the contract specifies a remedy for economic loss and that no other 
remedy may be pursued, the plaintiff should recover only under that 
contractual remedy.  If the contract is silent regarding the remedy for 
economic loss, then courts should apply the economic loss rule in the event 
that the plaintiff attempts to recoup economic loss under any type of tort 
cause of action.307  Finally, if the defendant waives protection of the 
economic loss rule as a condition to the contract, courts should not assert 
the economic loss rule.  In other words, in situations where the parties to a 
contract are sophisticated players who bargain (or could have bargained) for 
the allocation of economic loss, the economic loss rule should always 
apply, unless the contract says otherwise. 
 
 301. See supra notes 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 266, 279–81 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 305. See infra Part III.B. 
 306. See supra notes 144–57 and accompanying text. 
 307. As stated in Part I.C, the contractual privity form of the economic loss rule often 
does not apply where the defendant owes the plaintiff an independent duty separate from the 
contract. See supra notes 158–74 and accompanying text.  However, under the framework 
advanced by this Note, the economic loss rule would apply in such instances.  At the heart of 
this approach is strict deference to the contract but only with respect to sophisticated parties 
who negotiate in perfect or close to perfect bargaining conditions. 
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In determining whether the economic loss rule should be invoked in the 
context of contractual privity, the terms of the contract should be the most 
important factor that courts take into consideration, especially where the 
parties to a contract are sophisticated players on equal footing.308  Although 
Florida courts previously considered the terms that parties to a contract 
bargained for when applying the economic loss rule,309 this Note not only 
contends that Florida courts should return to a contractual privity form of 
the doctrine, but moreover, this Note is unique in that it argues for absolute 
deference to the contract in instances where sophisticated parties bargain at 
arm‘s length.  In addition, where the plaintiff could have, but did not 
actually bargain for a particular matter, courts should treat such an instance 
as within the scope of the economic loss rule and refuse to entertain the 
plaintiff‘s tort claims.310 
Although an approach where absolute deference to the contract governs 
application of the economic loss rule would place an extra burden on the 
courts to inquire into the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, 
such an approach preserves the sanctity and integrity of the contract.311  
Furthermore, such an approach is needed to reinforce the boundary line 
between tort law and contract law so as to prevent sophisticated plaintiffs 
from circumventing the allocation of loss bargained for in their contract.312 
CONCLUSION 
The economic loss rule can be a valuable tool to permit or bar plaintiffs 
from recovering their economic losses under tort law.  However, due to the 
differing views and approaches to applying the doctrine, it can also be 
confusing for courts and litigants to determine when the economic loss rule 
should be applied.  This Note has attempted to resolve the confusion of 
applying the economic loss rule in a specific context:  where sophisticated 
parties to a contract bargained (or could have bargained) for the allocation 
of risk and economic loss in their contract. 
Despite its origins, the economic loss rule is not just for products 
liability.  Rather, the doctrine serves a broader purpose to protect the 
boundary line between tort law and contract law.  In circumstances where 
sophisticated parties to a contract bargained (or could have bargained) for 
the allocation of economic loss, the only relevant factor to determine 
whether the economic loss rule should apply is the contract itself.  Florida 
courts should redefine the limit of the economic loss rule to include such 
circumstances and should strongly consider applying the economic loss 
rule, unless the contract says otherwise.  For now, however, it is clear that 
in Florida, and other jurisdictions that may potentially adopt such a narrow 
application of the economic loss rule, defendants may no longer rely on the 
doctrine to dismiss tort claims outside the realm of products liability. 
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